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This paper examines the views of Joseph-Márie Degérando and Wilhelm
Gottlieb Tennemann about empiricism, and the scope and limits of experience
as well as its relation to reason and its role in the attainment of true knowledge.
While Degérando adopted the “philosophy of experience” and Tennemann ad-
vocated Kant’s critical philosophy, both authors blamed each other for the same
mistake: if Degérando considered that, despite all appearances to the contrary,
critical philosophy fell into empiricism, Tennemann judged that the philosophy
of experience was nothing but pure and simple empiricism. Degérando’s and
Tennemann’s discrepancies involved not only a discussion of “nomenclatures”
and of the role and limits of experience in knowing, but also an epistemological
and ideological commitment to the pacification of the intellectual field in the
aftermath of the French Revolution. In this line, Degérando’s alignment with
the philosophy of experience attempted to distance himself from the politically
dangerous sensualism attributed to the idéologie. But, unlike his country-
man Charles Villers, he did not want to replace the sensualism by critical
philosophy. His opposition to philosophical novelty (which he associated with
political revolution) led him to praise only the “eclectic” spirit of Kant’s
philosophy.
1. Introduction
In 1804 Joseph-Márie Degérando (1772–1842) claimed, in his wide-
ranging Histoire comparée des systémes de philosophie, that all the European
philosophical schools of his time shared in different degrees a number of
general points, among which he noted a strong distrust of the use of hy-
potheses and a unanimous agreement to recognize the authority of experi-
ence. The battle for the cause of experience has been nearly won and the
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tribute currently payed to it by the schools that historically tended to fight
against it, bears testimony to that victory. Such a recognition of the legit-
imate value of experience will result in a more useful science, for it will be
increasingly based on well-established facts (Degérando 1802–4, 3,
pp. 108–109, 112).1
In this connection, Degérando judged that the most important issue
dividing the European philosophical scene at that time was the distinction
between “experience” [expérience] and “empiricism” [Empirisme] (1802–
4, 3, p. 438).2 In emphasizing the significance of such a distinction, he
alluded on the one hand to a mistake that he thought was recurrently
made across history and, on the other hand, to the classificatory categories
employed by contemporary German historians who had merged both con-
cepts into one. A few years later, in his German translation of Degérando’s
Histoire comparée, the German Kantian historian Wilhelm Gottlieb
Tennemann (1761–1819) addressed this same question by challenging
Degérando’s views.
Whereas Degérando’s approach relied on the “philosophy of experience”
and was aligned with the school of Francis Bacon and John Locke,
Tennemann’s position was anchored in Kant’s critical philosophy. Both
Degérando and Tennemann condemned empiricism as a wrong system
which does not conceive experience in a proper way. Moreover, each one
qualified the perspective adopted by the other as a kind of “unwanted em-
piricism”: if Degérando considered that, despite all appearances to the con-
trary, critical philosophy fell into empiricism, Tennemann judged that the
philosophy of experience was nothing but pure and simple empiricism.
This paper will examine the views of Degérando and Tennemann. They
allow us to survey the basic elements through which empiricism was dis-
cussed in the early nineteenth-century encounter of French philosophy
with German critical philosophy. Those elements were maintained well
into the century and had consequences on contemporary scientific devel-
opments, notably in the emerging psychology of the time.3 Degérando’s
commitment to the philosophy of experience was informed by the intellectual-
political goal of providing a moderate and eclectic philosophical middle
1. I will quote from Degérando’s first edition of the Histoire comparée. As a rule, refer-
ences to Degérando’s Histoire comparée and Tennemann’s translation will be put together,
when I want to indicate the parallel passage from the original French commented on by
Tennemann. Unless otherwise indicated all translations are my own.
2. The same view on the centrality of experience in the European intellectual debate
in the nineteenth century was held later by Cousin. See Antoine-Mahut’s paper in this
issue, pp. 680–703.
3. The paper in this issue by Daniel Whistler shows particularly the first point, whereas
the contributions of Delphine Antoine-Mahut and Denise Vincenti testify to the later.
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way.4 That was his main affinity with the Kantian system as a whole. I will
contend that by his alignment with the philosophy of experience he at-
tempted not only to distance himself from the extreme empiricism into
which he thought some developments of French idéologie had fallen, but also
wanted to express his strong disagreement with respect to a new character
entering the French philosophical scene: German critical philosophy.
2. The Encounter of French Philosophy of Experience with German Critical
Philosophy
British, French, and German traditions convergent into the intellectual
setting of post-revolutionary France were involved in the nineteenth-
century discussion on experience. While eclecticism was beginning to gain
ground while idéologie was slowly declining, German critical philosophy
was entering France through a slow and complex reception which caused
a wide range of responses (Bonnet 2007; Quillien 1994; Azouvi and Bourel
1991). Degérando’s intellectual and political itinerary expresses the
displacement from idéologie towards eclecticism and the interactions of both
traditions. If the proximity to idéologie is evident in his early works specif-
ically concerned with the theory of signs and the generation of knowledge
(1800–1802),4 in his historiographical work—published in three revised
editions between 1802 and 1847—idéologie does not play a prominent role
but is inserted into an eclectic program which prefigures Cousin’s “spiritual
eclecticism.” From the eclectic standpoint, Degérando endorsed the
“philosophy of experience,” represented by Bacon and Locke, as the best
moderate possible system.
It has been claimed that, besides his obvious and explicit adherence
to ideas coming from Bacon, Locke, and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac,
Degérando’s stance has Kantian components (Hassler 1994, pp. 80–82;
Daled 2005, pp. 81–2; Braverman 2015, pp. 18–19). Undoubtedly, Kant
was the German philosopher that most received his attention. He was
familiar with Kant’s works at least since 1797 and even began a translation
of some pieces which never reached completion (Hassler 1994, p. 80). His
contemporaries Maine de Biran and Charles Villers judged that Degérando
tried to conciliate the idéologie, the philosophy of Locke or the philosophy
of Condillac with Kantianism (Azouvi and Bourel 1991, pp. 238–45;
Hassler 1994; Daled 2005, p. 82; Braverman 2015, pp. 15–20). However,
the spirit of conciliation that animated Degérando’s history did not
impede him from maintaining and expressing strong divergences with
4. Des signes et de l’art de penser dans leurs rapports mutuels (1800) and De la génération des
connaissances humaines (1802).
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critical philosophy. In fact, what he wanted to rescue as the highest value
of Kant’s philosophy that which he interpreted as its eclectic gesture, a
gesture which coincided with his goal of pacifying the intellectual field.
In Histoire comparée, he carefully examined and compared critical philoso-
phy against the merits of the philosophy of experience. The result of this
assessment, he pointed out, is that the only philosophy which met the
proper middle-term and neutral, un-extreme position was the line that
connected Bacon to Locke.
Degérando’s contact with Kantianism was not limited to Kant’s pri-
mary sources but extended to his “partisans,” among which he included
historians of philosophy such as Karl L. Reinhold (1757–1823), Johann
G. Buhle (1763–1821), Georg G. Fülleborn (1769–1803) and Tennemann
(Degérando 1802–1804, 2: pp. 254, 271–72). He believed that German
historiography, including Kantian historians, produced the most impor-
tant narratives of the history of philosophy (1802–1804, 1, pp. 58–64).
As for Tennemann in particular, he regretted that so far only the first
two volumes of his Geschichte der Philosophie were published and assumed
that the series was interrupted.5 Even if Degérando suggested that the
“extreme redundancy” and the “scarcely pleasant” forms of the work could
have harmed its reception, he judges that it could have provided one of
the most complete and exact collections of philosophical material (2,
p. 254n2).6
Tennemann shared Degérando’s praise of German historiography and
was convinced that his nation did more than any other for the cultivation
of the discipline. Why, then, was he engaged with the translation of a
French history of philosophy, like Degérando’s Histoire comparée, a couple
of years after it came out in its first French edition? Tennemann explained
the reasons motivating his decision: Degérando’s history is the most careful
and complete French history of philosophy, combining the literary merits
typical of the French style with lively exposition, good depictions and com-
parisons, and clear opinions and surveys. More than this, Tennemann praised
so highly the stylistic vivacity and clarity of Degérando’s exposition that he
5. In the second edition of Histoire he made wide use of Tennemann’s Geschichte in
reference to ancient philosophy. Tennemann’s Geschichte remained unfinished due to his
death, but was not interrupted. It took a long time to publish the 11 volumes (in 12 tomes)
that could be accomplished (Leipzig: Barth, 1798–1819). Apparently in Degérando 1802–4,
2, p. 254 the author refers to volume one (1798) and volume two (1799) of Geschichte. The
other major historical work by Tennemann was the extraordinarily successful Grundriss der
Geschichte der Philosophie, a compendium first published in 1812 (Leipzig: 1812, 18162). See
Micheli 2015.
6. Tennemann does not add any remark on Degérando’s brief comment on his histo-
riographical work (Tennemann 1806, 1, p. 526).
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even judged that, in that regard, French authors surpass German ones
(Tennemann 1806, 1, pp. xvii–xviii). However, Tennemann’s chauvinism
emerged again when, unsurprisingly, he suggested that Degérando’s superi-
ority over other French historians might be “a result from his greater famil-
iarity with German literature” (1806, 1, pp. vii–ix). Although Degérando’s
expositions sometimes are not detailed enough, the work serves as a proper
starting point for further investigations, for it provides insightful compari-
sons of philosophical systems and excellent remarks on the path of reason
across history (Tennemann 1806, 1, pp. xiv–xv).
An additional reason for translating Degérando lies in the fact that he is
one of the few who made the effort to knowing and understanding Kant’s
philosophy by reading its work in the German version.7 Tennemann took
for granted that it is undoubtedly important to know the opinions of a
French scholar on critical philosophy and the consequences that critical
philosophy can have in as cultivated a nation as France, all the more so
given the fact that Degérando’s work would probably influence the
reception of Kant in the French learned public (Tennemann 1806, 1,
pp. x–xi). He was not wrong: Degérando’s work transformed the reception
of Kantianism and set the tone of Cousin’s interpretation of critical phi-
losophy (Azouvi and Bourel 1991, pp. 260–62).
We must say that Tennemann’s objective of offering a fluent German
rendering of the French original, loyal to the mind and to the content
of the work, is mostly accomplished. The translator sought to introduce
modifications just to correct formal errors, or to improve and complete bib-
liographical quotations and references. As for the notes of his own, added
in the footnote apparatus, Tennemann decided to hold a middle way be-
tween a refutation of the views with which he disagrees, or no refutation at
all (Tennemann 1806, 1, pp. xx–xxi).8 As we shall see, the overall strategy
of Tennemann’s notes consisted in showing that Degérando’s views, when
they were correct, were unconsciously Kantian, while his mistakes were
caused in one way or another by his disagreements with critical philoso-
phy. The corollary of this move would reveal that critical philosophy is the
best system.
3. Looking for Peace in the Intellectual World
Degérando’s Histoire comparée was meant to offer “a geographical map of the
doctrines and opinions that constitute the intellectual world” (Degérando
7. The first translation of the Critique of Pure Reason into French was published in
1835: Kant, I., Critique de la raison pure. Trad. Joseph Tisson, Paris, Librairie de Ladrange.
8. Such translation policy is perfectly suited to Tennemann’s historiographical theory.
See Micheli 2015, p. 851.
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1802–4, 1, p. xvi) and to reach a “treatise of peace” between opposed
philosophical schools (1, p. xxxviii). In this context, the author considered
both the issue of experience and the classification and nomenclature of al-
ternative philosophical stances on experience to be highly important. All
the more so as his historiographical method combines the careful and de-
scriptive registering of philosophical systems as historical facts of the intel-
lectual world—in the vein of Francis Bacon’s literary history—with the
classification and nomenclatural procedures practiced by naturalists like
Cuvier and Dumas (Piaia 2004, pp. 32–3). Accordingly, the work is divided
into two major parts: an historical part which offers a chronological de-
scription of philosophical systems; and a critical part which classifies them
according to their common “characters,” judges their philosophical value,
and finds out the general path of human mind across history.
From the narrative offered in the descriptive part of the work Degérando
concludes that, when their peculiarities and differences are put aside, the
main concern of all philosophical systems is the generation of knowledge
and its legitimation by reason.9 Thus, the nature of knowledge and the
three main questions related to it (certainty, origin, and reality of knowl-
edge) constitute the fundamental subject of philosophy (Degérando 1802–
4, 3, pp. 340–41). This focus on knowledge and its three main questions is
one of the main merits which Tennemann recognized in Degérando’s work.
That is because every philosophical system starts from certain explicit or
implicit assumptions on knowledge and finds its ultimate ground on them
(Tennemann 1806, 1, pp. xii–xiii).
As for Degérando’s goal of pacification, it consists in adopting the sys-
tem which constitutes a middle way between opposed and exaggerated po-
sitions. His approach of history led him to believe that the philosophy of
its day was not able to create completely new systems. The best thing to do
for a philosopher is to conciliate already available systems in such a way
that every exaggeration and error would be left aside (Degérando 1802–4,
3, pp. 562–63; 2, p. 344). In his view only the philosophy of experience
meets the condition of being the proper middle way between a series of
opposed systems: “dogmatism and skepticism,”, “rationalism and empiri-
cism,” “idealism and materialism” (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 505, 562).
In this regard, Tennemann pointed out that Degérando’s concern with
building an “eternal peace” (rendered by Tennemann as ewigen Frieden, re-
sembling Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden [Perpetual peace]) in the battlefield of
9. Despite Degérando’s claims that this is a conclusion drawn from the descriptive part
of the Histoire, it seems more like a presupposition on which relies the entire narrative of the
work. All the more so if we bear in mind that his previous work was directly concerned
with the generation of knowledge.
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philosophy was also a Kantian concern.10 However, Tennemann believed
that only the Kantian way to reach this aim, namely “the discipline of
reason”, can be successful (Tennemann 1806, 1, pp. xiv–v).
Degérando’s goal of the pacifying of the philosophical battlefield has a
philosophical and a political connotation. From a philosophical point of
view, his concern with clarifying the meaning and role of experience in
attaining knowledge and endorsing the philosophy of experience can be
understood as a reassessment of his proximity to the idéologie as manifested
in some of his previous writings, Des signes et de l’art de penser dans leurs
rapports mutuels (1800) and De la génération des connaissances humaines
(1802). From a political perspective, his critical stance towards the philos-
ophy of Condillac, the main inspiration of idéologie, and of the idéologues in
general was linked to his concern with maintaining his reputation un-
touched by the negative political connotations which both contempo-
rary rightwing and leftwing intellectuals, and Napoleon Bonaparte
himself, had associated with this philosophical trend (Daled 2005; Piaia
2004, pp. 37–38). While Bacon and Locke are the heroes of his narrative,
Condillac deviated from the right path started by them.11
4. Empiricism and Philosophy of Experience
The first definition of empiricism provided in Histoire comparée depicts it
as the extreme and exaggerated system which opposed to rationalism. In
focusing exclusively on sensible impressions, empiricism “forbids the data
obtained from experience to receive the assistance of speculative truths”
(Degérando 1802–4, 2, p. 359). Later, empiricism in general is defined
as an abuse of the maxims of experience, from which two general conse-
quences derive: 1) the attempt to retain the intellect in a state of passivity
and external dependence; and 2) the prohibition of abstract reasoning
which establishes links among facts and derives knowledge-claims beyond
immediate experience (3, pp. 339, 441).
There is a kind of pre-philosophical empiricism, which Degérando
called “blind empiricism” and which consists in a state of ignorance which
“abandons itself exclusively to sense impressions, to mechanical habits,
10. We must evoke here Kant’s characterization of metaphysics as a battle field in the
preface to KrV (A viii – B, p. xv). That critical philosophy entailed an “eternal peace” in the
field of philosophy was assumed by other defenders of Kant’s system. See for instance
Heydenreich, Originalideen, 1: 11, quoted in Park 2013, pp. 21, 165n87. It may be worth
noting that Zum ewigen Frieden was one of the first of Kant’s works translated into French
(1796). See Braverman 2015, pp. 3–4.
11. On Degérando’s philosophical agreements and disagreements with idéologie, par-
ticularly with Condillac, see Braunstein 1990; Hassler 1994, esp. pp. 80–83; Chappey
et al. 2014, pp. 12–13. Piaia 2004, pp. 32, 77 repeats Cousin’s judgment with respect
to Degérando’s “hesitant Condillacism.”
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[and] to a servile imitation” (Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 439; cf. 1,
p. 360n1). In contrast, the other kind, coined “systematic empiricism,”
belongs to philosophy properly. It arises from the methodical and delicate
reflection and analysis, by which mind discovers the limitations of the in-
duction and of philosophical systems and decides to reduce all knowledge
to particular facts and contingent truths, rejecting any kind of general
maxims and principles, and the connection between causes and effects.
This philosophical empiricism reduces the intellectual faculties to “exter-
nal sensation,” on the assumption that the human mind is completely
passive. Hence, it establishes that mind must not make any deduction
above the isolated and temporary sense impressions (3, pp. 439–40).
Philosophical empiricism diversified into several ramifications across
history, to the point that it has been known under different names accord-
ing to the kind of speculations which it excluded from the philosophical
compass. Hence, it has been called “materialism,” “sensualism”, “atheism”,
and “skepticism.” This last denomination has been the most widespread,
for, after all, empiricism is in fact “a doubt raised about all general knowl-
edge” (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 441–42n2). The origins of systematic
empiricism date back to the ancient sophistic school. In the early modern
period it was adopted by Hobbes, Helvetius, Rudiger, and Hartley.
Helvétius and Hume are said to be the most important modern empiricists
(2, pp. 358–59; 3, pp. 97, 438, 442–5).12 Particularly relevant for
Degérando’s reconstruction was to show that Hume’s philosophy repre-
sented the most elaborated and widespread version of empiricism (labelled
“relative skepticism”) at the time. Even more important was countering
the historiographical identification of Locke as empiricist. The same goes
for Bacon, of whom Locke was the most loyal disciple: both philosophers
were the most genuine representatives of the philosophy of experience.
Degérando’s map of the history of philosophy invokes constantly the
distinction between empiricism and the philosophy of experience—also
called “experimental philosophy” —and regrets that some “German histo-
rians” feign (affectent) to confuse them.13 Despite the fact that empiricism
and the philosophy of experience share the same departure point, namely,
12. The list of the empiricists provided in the historical part is far shorter than the list
offered in the critical part.
13. We can conjecture that Degérando is alluding to Reinhold and Buhle, the histo-
rians who had developed the widespread distinction between rationalism—empiricism.
Notably, Tennemann did not add any comment on this reproach to German historians
(Tennemann 1806, 2, p. 16n3). This fact could be interpreted as a hint that he did not
care for this reproach because he felt that he himself was not alluded by it. For a careful and
insightful study of the construction of the distinction between rationalism and empiricism
in early German historiography, and the role played by Reinhold and Buhle, see Vanzo
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facts, they work on them in very different ways. In empiricism, facts re-
main “isolated, scattered, [and] unanimated”; they are not allowed to be
transformed to reach new truths by the interposition of general truths. In
contrast, in the philosophy of experience, facts become “useful” in virtue of
general laws subsuming them. If empiricism is an “instinct” which only
“sees phenomena,” the philosophy of experience is an “art.”While the phi-
losophy of experience can predict facts and discover natural regularities by
means of a methodical interrogation of past facts, empiricism is circum-
scribed to present facts and assumes that everything in nature is ephemeral
and changing (Degérando 1802–4, 2, pp. 359–360n1).
According to Degérando, the origin of the association of Locke with
systematic empiricism, is to be found in Leibniz. Certainly, Locke’s re-
course to reflection (réflexion) as a source of knowledge, the postulation
of “identity and relation,” and the role attributed to demonstration, par-
ticularly in moral sciences, are enough to deny his alleged adherence to
empiricism. Degérando admitted that Locke’s philosophy does not provide
all the necessary tools to defeat empiricism, in so far as its arguments in
favor of causal connection were too weak and his maxims concerning the
inutility of identical propositions were unelaborated. As for Condillac, he
admitted that, although in the Art de raisoner (1775) the author explains
very well the alliance between abstract and experimental truths, in other
works his claims about “transformed sensation” might justify counting
him as an empiricist (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 445–46).
This attempt to refute the Leibnizian categorization of Locke as empir-
icist does not prove very efficient. Actually, it succeeds in showing that
Locke’s philosophy can be easily developed into empiricism, rather than
in persuading that Locke was not empiricist. Both Locke and Condillac
are said to have made the mistake of claiming that the process of general-
ization for attaining knowledge occurs in the same way as the generaliza-
tion of ideas, and that the order of succession in the acquisition of ideas is
the same as the necessary order of demonstration. Such assumptions entail
that general truths cannot be anything but remembrances of past experi-
ences. In the same vein, abstract truths cannot function as the principles of
demonstrations, for abstract ideas are only acquired from experience. In
addition, it follows that “identical propositions” (namely, analytic proposi-
tions) are unable to link or to modify in any sense individual facts
(Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 446–47). Hume’s and Helvétius’s philosophies
2016. On Degérando’s assessment of this distinction see Manzo 2016. A similar claim
against the German confusion is found in Dugald Stewart, a representative of the Scottish
Enlightenment, reader and friend of Degérando. See Stewart 1854–1860, 1, pp. 396–97n2.
See Degérando 1847, 3, p. 52nE.
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exhibit the full-fledged negative consequences that can be derived from
Locke’s or Condillac’s principles: while Hume denied necessary causal con-
nection and the possibility of absolute knowledge, Helvétius reduced hu-
man intelligence to passive external sensation.
5. The Merits of the Speculative Philosophy
The main concern of Degérando’s considerations about empiricism is to
solve the problem raised by Hume’s skeptical doubts about causal neces-
sary connection: this issue lies at the basis of the fundamental philosophical
problem of the day touching the confusion between empiricism and expe-
rience (Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 448). Degérandos solution to Hume’s
challenge claims that the mind forms the notion of causal connection by
the “interposition of abstract and speculative truths” between facts. Spec-
ulative truths are particular kinds of relations between “simple” ideas, that
is, of present or past ideas that are “seen and embraced by one only act of
the mind” (Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 450), regardless of the actual exis-
tence of the objects they represent. These ideas can be properly said to be
“experimental” in the sense that the mind is conscious of their presence. By
discovering the relations among simple ideas, the mind obtains abstract or
speculative truths, which are a priori, necessary and universal. Degérando
held that “regarding their generality” such truths are “independent and
prior to experience.” The precise implication given to this expression is
in line with Hume’s relation of ideas: regardless of the existence of the
objects of these propositions, only the mind legitimates their relations,
for they do not establish a relation between (real) objects but between per-
ceived ideas. One instance of these speculative or abstract truths is “The
whole is greater than its parts” (3, pp. 453–55).
Degérando went one step further by claiming that these speculative
truths are useful to the advancement of knowledge. That is because, due
to the analogy or the identity which an idea has with another idea, the
latter represents the former, transferring its contents to it. In a series of
enchained ideas, related to each other in such a way that they keep the
same analogy or identity, the last idea will be representative of all the pre-
vious ones. If the first element of the series is a perception, the last idea will
represent it, except for its “actual and objective reality” (réalité actuelle et
objective),14 since this is the only characteristic of perceptions which cannot
be transferred to an idea. For that reason, speculative philosophy—whose
reasonings are based only on speculative truths—may not aspire to draw
conclusions containing a reality that was not already provided by the
premises. That is, by this way it is impossible to conclude facts from a
14. That is, the reality of anything independent of the subject.
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priori (in Degérando’s sense of the word) premises (Degérando 1802–4, 3:
455–6). These primitive truths—even if they are only abstract and spec-
ulative15—are legitimate universal principles admitted by every human
being, as Locke had held. In this sense, they determine a priori the possible
combinations and conditions for propositions derived from them, from
general to subordinated truths (3, pp. 459–60).
Locke, Condillac and, later Kant, Degérando argued, had objected to the
possibility that these truths allow for the discovering of new truths. Yet,
this objection is unfounded, since although speculative truths are just rela-
tions of ideas, they make it possible to find out previously not recognized
ideas in the order of speculative knowledge. Unlike Kant, he did not think
that new truths are yielded only by synthetic judgments (Degérando 1802–
4, 3, pp. 460–62). No wonder, Tennemann disagreed with Degérando by
claiming that, in the attempt to argue that analytic judgements amplify our
knowledge, he confused the form with the content, the subjective with the
objective aspect of knowledge. Certainly, it can be said that the subject can
discover or become aware of some truths derived from analytic judgments.
This does not entail, however, that a new object or content of knowledge is
discovered, for the object was already included in the judgment. For that
reason, there is no new discovery in the strict sense of the word (Tennemann
1806, 2, p. 439).
Referring to a doctrine already introduced in his Des signes (Degérando
1800, Part I, section II, ch. VI-V) Degérando maintained that those identical
truths, which are primitives, are “truths of transformation” (Degérando
1802–4, 3, pp. 463–66; cf. pp. 212–13), because (like it occurs in mathe-
matics) they allow to substitute equivalent expressions, by means of compo-
sition and decomposition of already available ideas. On this account,
primitive speculative truths are highly valuable means for obtaining new
speculative knowledge. In endorsing these views, Degérando’s eclectic move
recuperates a “true” tenet of what he called “speculative philosophy,” that a
moderate philosophical middle-way must keep.
When commenting on Degérando’s considerations about the specula-
tive philosophy, Tennemann observed that because of his leaning towards
the philosophy of experience, the French philosopher failed to recognize
that, besides the wrong kind of speculation analyzed in this chapter, there
is a proper speculative philosophy consisting in an investigation of the ul-
timate foundations of knowledge (namely, Kant’s critical philosophy)
(Tennemann 1806, 2, p. 278; Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 225). Tennemann’s
judgment, however, failed to notice that, as we have seen and will see in
15. In this context, Degérando seems to reduce everything to identities, although
previously he had differentiated between analogies and identities.
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the next section, in underlying the positive role of speculative truths,
Degérando was indeed pointing out the benefits of speculative philosophy.
6. Causal Connection and the Claims against Empiricism
Regardless of its merits, Degérando believed that speculative philoso-
phy is wrong when it pretends that the identity behind speculative truths
allows them to reach new truths about facts, transcending the limits of
their empirical basis. This does not entail, however, that speculative truths
are useless to gain “experimental knowledge” (connaissances expérimentales).
To the contrary, they can be of use by being “interposed” between prim-
itive and subordinated factual truths (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 465–66).
That is the way in which reason and experience must cooperate to obtain
new experimental knowledge. This conciliation between the speculative
function of reason and the informative power of experience constitutes
the core of the philosophy of experience advocated by Degérando.
Speculative truths can “intermediate” between primitive and subordi-
nated factual truths in different ways. When they interpose themselves be-
tween a bundle of immediately perceived facts and a bundle of facts “simply
combined by the imagination” they form our notion of causal connection.
In this case, speculative truths compare both terms and transform each
other to the point of reducing them to similar expressions, making it pos-
sible to find out that both terms, despite being diverse in their forms, are
“really identical as far as their elements are concerned” and, therefore, that
reason is entitled to conclude from one to another, and to transfer to the
latter the reality found in the former (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 467–68).
Degérando underlined the reality of causal relations, by claiming that if
an “absolute law” would not exist, a constancy of conjoined events
wouldn’t either. Given the fact that the human mind perceives constancy
by experience, it is entitled to infer the existence of laws. In summary,
Degérando argued, the “reasoning supporting the connection of effects
with causes is nothing, but a transformation done by experience” (n’est donc
qu’ une transformation de l’expérience [3, p. 478; italics in the original]).
By this move, he seems to mean that the transformation done by specula-
tive truths is not a psychological imposition of the mind (or of the mind’s
habits) on factual reality. Neither is it a condition established by a tran-
scendental subject. To the contrary, the epistemic “usefulness” of specula-
tive truths has a metaphysical basis which warrants the truth-value of the
discoveries gained by it: causal connection between facts (Degérando
1802–4, 3, p. 469).
That notwithstanding, when arguing how causal connections support
the conclusions on facts drawn from the speculative truths, Degérando’s
point proves to be quite inconsistent. He argued that the causal relation
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is deduced from the supposition of the constancy of phenomena. In turn,
such a constancy can only be deduced from present and past experi-
ences with the sole assistance of “transformation or identity reasonings”
(Degérando 1802–4, 3: 469–470). Thus, the circularity of this reasoning
is obvious: the truth-value of the transformations operated by speculative
truths depends on the casual connection which is grounded on an assump-
tion depending on the transformations operated by speculative truths. A
fortiori, this circularity undermines Degérando’s claim for an alternative
solution to explain wherein lies the “secret connection” between causes
and effects. In other words, the intermediary function of speculative truths
cannot be the clue to solve the question, precisely because the epistemic
legitimacy of speculative truths is supported by causal connection.
To illustrate his point, Degérando somehow recreated Hume’s exposi-
tion of the genesis of the belief in causal connection and—in a simplified
way—draws on Laplace’s etiological principle and on Bernouilli’s stochas-
tic principle for the calculus of probabilities16 as instruments by which the
mind can reach a decision about whether two conjoined events are causally
connected by a law of nature (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 471–74; cf.
pp. 490–92n1). Unlike the defenders of the calculus of probabilities quoted
by him (Laplace, Bernoulli, Prevost and Lhuilier), he thought that the real
existence of causation must not be presupposed to demonstrate it through
the calculus of probability (3, p. 476n1). On this point, Tennemann sided
with the probabilistic approach criticized by Degérando and offered the
well-known Kantian solution to the problem raised by Hume (Tennemann
1806, 2, p. 450).
In addition, Degérando recovered the epistemic value of induction and
hypothesis against the objections raised on them, by arguing that if they
are properly and cautiously employed, without exceeding the limits of an
empirical basis, they are very useful at indicating the truth and at stimu-
lating imaginative ways for further inquiry (Degérando 1802–4, 3,
pp. 495–98). This empiricist criticism of induction actually reveals how
harmful to natural sciences and moral sciences systematic empiricism
can be. Being tied to individual experiences, empiricism is incapable of
combining, generalizing, and transforming them for discovering causes,
laws, and systems, and predicting natural events. The same goes when
empiricism is applied to the study of the human mind. By reducing every
mental operation to passive impressions produced by external stimuli on
bodily organs, empiricism ignores the difference between sensation
16. Degérando equates Laplace’s etiologic principle with Bernouilli’s stochastic prin-
ciple (see Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 474n1). On the probability of causes and associationism
in Hume, Condorcet, Hartley, Laplace and Bernouilli see Daston 1988, ch. 4 and 5.
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(passivity) and perception (activity) (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 500–501).
Condillac is the main target of Degérando’s criticisms in this context.17
His notion of “transformed sensation” not only is quite obscure, but also
confuses the intellectual active faculties with the sensation they act upon
(Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 500–501). In neglecting the existence of a self
as an active principle and eliminating the sound Lockean distinction be-
tween sensation and reflection, Condillac proves to be an unruly follower of
Locke.18
7. Critical Philosophy, Empiricism and the Philosophical Middle Way
According to Degérando, the highest merit of Kant’s critical philoso-
phy lies in its awareness of the necessity of a philosophical middle way
(Degérando 1802–4, 3: 505–508). This reading transformed the French
reception of Kant by advancing a view different from that offered by the
main French propagandist of critical philosophy at the turn of the nine-
teenth century, Charles Villers (1765–1815) (Azouvi and Bourel 1991,
pp. 260–265; cf. Bonnet 2007, pp. 50–56; Piaia 2004, 72–75). Émigré
for many years in Germany and opponent to the République, Villers cam-
paigned for establishing critical philosophy as the “new philosophy” which
should replace the sensualism dominant in the French philosophical mi-
lieu. In Villers’s genealogy, sensualism was an offspring of Condillac’s em-
piricism which, by suppressing the notion of “reflection” and reducing
mental contents and faculties to “sensation”, reformed Locke’s “orthodox”
empiricism. D’Alembert, Diderot, D’Argens, La Mettrie, Helvétius and
Voltaire created sensualism and developed a metaphysics of sense and a mo-
rality of passions, whose inescapable corollary was Jacobinism.19
Certainly, Degérando agreed with Villers in identifying sensualism and
empiricism as an outstanding current deserving criticism. However, he
thought that Villers did not expound the true orientation of Kant’s phi-
losophy (Degérando 1802–4, 2: 179n). Their receptions of critical philos-
ophy differed for two main reasons. On the one hand, they had different
philosophical and political goals: in contrast to Degérando, Villers did not
look for a mild middle way to pacify the philosophical (and political)
battlefield, but for a mortal weapon to beat his adversaries. Accordingly,
17. For a good survey of Degérando’s stance towards Condillac’s philosophy, in par-
ticular towards the theory of signs from Des signes till Histoire, see Ricken 1986, pp. 23–8.
18. Tennemann’s thought that Degérando’s interpretation of Locke’s philosophy un-
derestimated the extent to which Locke confined knowledge to the limits of experience
(Tennemann 1806, 2, p. 257; Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 207). Cousin raised the same crit-
icism against Degérando’s depiction of Locke in his course on Locke. My thanks go to
Delphine Antoine-Mahut for this remark.
19. On Villers see Azouvi and Bourel 1991, pp. 113–36; Bonnet 2007, pp. 24–38.
On Villers’s genealogy of sensualism see Daled 2005, pp. 64–7.
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Villers’s exposition of Kant’s philosophy emphasized the elements that re-
futed the greatest mistakes and drawbacks of sensualism. He showed that
sensation as characterized by sensualism is insufficient to explain human
knowledge, and that critical philosophy provides the very foundation of
experience. Besides, he campaigned for a replacement of a moral based
on passions and self-interest by the Kantian moral of duty and “reasonable
freedom.” On the other hand, while Degérando thought that the only pos-
sible novelty in the history of philosophy consisted in new forms of har-
monizing pre-existent ideas, Villers believed that new systems overcoming
the precedent ones were possible. Hence, he saw critical philosophy as the
new philosophy that should help France to overcoming its intellectual dec-
adence. Certainly, in this positive stance towards Kant’s “novelty,” Villers
introduced a turn into the earlier French reception of Kant. While by
1796 Siéyes saw in Kant’s Perpetual Peace an allied with the cause of
Revolution, Villers advocated for an academic Kantianism, whose novelty
would defeat the philosophical background of an illegitimate French
political revolution (Villers 1801, I, pp. 148–69, 184–89n1).
The French reception of Kant was newly modified by Degérando’s read-
ing. In his opinion, there is an essential opposition between the progress of
philosophy and revolution. The claim for radical novelty in philosophy was
inescapably linked to the claim for revolution in politics.20 Accordingly,
his opposition to philosophical novelty led him to recover only the aspects
of Kant’s philosophy more akin with eclecticism. However, Degérando ob-
served that, despite Kant’s intention, critical philosophy failed to overcome
the failures of dogmatism (3, pp. 512–15), rationalism (3, pp. 515–19),
idealism (3, pp. 519–25), materialism (3, pp. 525–27), and skepticism (3,
pp. 528–36): “If he seems to escape systems that he wants to fight is to
rush into the opposite system” (Degérando 1808, p. 211).21
Kant’s reaction to empiricism was the subject of the last and longest
analysis of Degérando (3, pp. 536–45). In this context, the French blamed
critical philosophy for the same reason that Tennemann blamed the
philosophy of experience: despite his disapproval of many aspects of em-
piricism, Kant’s philosophy is itself an empiricism without knowing it (3,
p. 537). This line of argument starts by distinguishing two ways of
considering empiricism: one with respect to the principles (of knowing)
and the other with respect to its results (that is, the acquired knowledge).
Then Degérando pretends to reconstruct Kant’s stances, in a way that has
20. On the detrimental link between the “immoderate love of innovation” and illegit-
imate political revolution see Degérando 1808, pp. 242–44, and Azouvi 1993, pp. 201–2.
21. In Degérando 1808, pp. 210–19, the author repeated the same judgement with
respect to critical philosophy as in the first edition of Histoire.
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scarce support in Kant’s texts. As for empiricism with respect to the prin-
ciples of knowing, Kant holds—according to Degérando—that empiri-
cism only recognizes subjective value to knowledge-claims. Empiricism
does not recognize real and objective causal connections between facts.
It admits, instead, subjective connections between ideas of facts.22
In this passage Degérando referred to the Critique of pure reason (KrV) B
3: 49923 (Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 537n1). There, empiricism is associ-
ated with the antinomy antitheses denying that the world has a beginning,
is spatially limited, indivisible, and free. They are said to correspond to “a
principle of pure empiricism,” according to which only sensible things
exist.24 Although this is indeed one of the few passages where the word
“empiricism” (Empirism) is mentioned in KrV, there is no reference at all
about the objective and the subjective connection as described by Degérando.
Concerning this last point, the French philosopher probably drew on the
KpV (which he quotes later, as we will see), where Kant uses the denomina-
tion “empiricism of principles” (Empirism in Grundsätzen) and links it to
Hume’s account of causation in terms of objective and subjective validity
and necessity. Furthermore, somewhere he even indicated its consequences
on the third “mathematical” antinomy concerned with the divisibility of
the world and on morality.25
That brings us, in Degérando’s account, to the Kantian concept of the
categories of pure reason: according to critical philosophy causal connec-
tion derives from a subjective principle, being one of the “categories”, so
that our mind “gives” (or imposes) its laws to nature (Degérando 1802–4,
3, pp. 537–38).26 The final part of this depiction of Kant’s views on
empiricism with respect to the principles of knowing deals with the argu-
ment that supports the objective validity of the category of causation in
particular.27 Degérando did not find any conceptual difference between
22. Degérando apparently quoted the second German edition of KrV (1787), although
in the footnote (Degérando 1802–4, 2, p. 177n1), where he indicated the editions of Kant’s
works that he read, he wrongly said “sec. edit. 1794” (actually, Tennemann’s replaces “1794”
for “1787”, Tennemann 1806, 1, p. 465). Again, in a footnote Degérando (1802–4, 3,
pp. 515–16) referred to the second edition (without mentioning the date of publication).
23. My references to Kant’s works are to the canonical edition of the Berliner Akademie
(Kant 1900–).
24. For Kant’s characterization of empiricism in this section, see Vanzo 2013, pp. 56–7
and id. 2014.
25. Kant 1900, KpV 5, pp. 12–13, 52–53.
26. In this case, he referred to Kant 1900, KrV B 3, pp. 165, 263, 830 (and “etc.”)
(Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 537n1).
27. He roughly translated or rather paraphrased passages from Kant 1900, KrV B 3,
pp. 125–26 (#14 of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories) (Degérando 1802–4,
3, p. 539n1).
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Kant’s transcendental deduction and the empiricist view that the connec-
tion between facts is nothing but a subjective connection lacking any cor-
respondence to the real and objective world. This line of argument led him
to suggest that Kant’s views are very similar to (albeit not identical with)
Hume’s and Hartley’s empiricism (3: 539–542). Against Kant, Degérando
maintains that he should have noted that the laws that our mind imposes
on nature are valid and necessary only for us, but should not pretend to
have any validity outside our subjectivity (3: 542).
As for empiricism with respect to the results, Degérando’s did not want
to discuss the issue, but only to rely on Kant’s texts. He seems to point out
that the Kantian knowledge of objects of experience results in an skeptical
stance.28 In this case, the French historian starts by referring to a passage
from the Critique of practical reason (KpV), alleging that Kant characterizes
empiricism regarding the results as the way of philosophizing that “only
admits the knowledge obtained from the objects perceived by the senses,
and eliminates the so-called a priori knowledge [of] the existence of God, of
the soul and their properties, etc., from the ambit of genuine knowl-
edge.”29 He immediately paraphrased (between quotation marks!) frag-
ments from the KrV where it is claimed that categories and intuitions
are the a priori conditions for experience, and that intuitions are always
sensible.30 From this perspective, Kant blames Locke for demonstrating
the existence of God on the assumption that God can be the object of a
sensible intuition.31 Degérando charged the “Kantian school” with “accus-
ing” the school of Locke of empiricism, by calling it “empiricist or sensualist”
(Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 542–44).
28. See, for instance, what Kant said in a passage from KpV (indicated by Degérando)
referring to the “consequences” of empiricism: “after removing empiricism from its origin, I
was able to overthrow the unavoidable consequence [unvermeindliche Folge] of empiricism,
namely skepticism first with respect to natural science and then, because skepticism in
mathematics follows from just the same grounds, with respect to mathematics as well, both
of which sciences have reference to objects of possible experience; in this way I was able to
eradicate total doubt of whatever theoretical reason professes to have insight into.” (Kant
1900, KpV 5, pp. 53–4). I quote the English translation Kant 2015.
29. I reproduce here a text between quotation marks that in a footnote loosely refers to
the 1792 edition of KpV (“p. 26, 89 ss.” = Kant 1900, 5, pp. 13, 53–4). According to the
references offered in Degérando 1802–4, 2, p. 177n1, they should indicate the “second
edition of 1795,” but, as Tennemann rightly notes, they refer to the 1792 edition. How-
ever, there is no literal equivalence to any passage from those pages. As usual, Degérando
paraphrased the original German.
30. Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 544n1 refers accurately to Kant 1900, KrV 3, p. 146.
31. Degérando referred here to Kant 1900, KrV B 3, p. 128, which is quite accurate
(Locke is mentioned in id. B 3, p. 127). See also the mention of Locke in this regard in id.
B 3, p. 882.
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Being nothing but an amalgamation of incompatible elements, critical
philosophy had produced new divisions, rather than leading to a pacifica-
tion of the philosophical field (Degérando 1802–4, 3, pp. 545–46).
Degérando’s final remark holds that Kant’s attempts to overcome the de-
ficiencies of previous systems remain ultimately useful in showing that
only the philosophy of experience is apt at providing the required solutions
and the proper middle way (3, pp. 550–51).
8. Tennemann’s Defense of Critical Philosophy
Tennemann’s comments on empiricism and the philosophical middle way
look like an inverted image of the points made by the French historian
concerning critical philosophy. He blamed the philosophy of experience
for the same drawbacks that Degérando found in Kant. Tennemann
rightly claimed that the characterization of the empiricism of principles
in the terms used by Degérando is not found in the text referred to by
him. Instead, he provided an alternative Kantian general definition of
empiricism as the thought that derives all pure rational knowledge (reine
Vernunfterkenntnisse) from experience, or that denies all a priori theoretical or
practical knowledge in general, accepting only sensible objects, or objects
of experience. In so doing, he reinterpreted the very same page from the
KrV B 3: 499 referred to by Degérando, and pointed to further passages
from Kant’s works.32
This definition of empiricism, Tennemann argued, describes the “pure
empiricism” endorsed by Kant, and in no way contradicts the principles of
critical philosophy. The origin of knowledge resides in experience and no
a priori material can justify knowledge-claims. If there is any sense in which
Kant’s philosophy can be said to be an overt or a hidden empiricism, it is
only in this Kantian sense of “good” empiricism (Tennemann 1806, 2,
p. 497; Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 537).33
Against what Degérando judged to be Kant’s failure at overcoming the
mistakes of the opposite systems, Tennemann’s response argued that the
middle way that Kant had provided consists in determining the limits
of knowledge a priori, so that reason should not aspire to reach objects
which are beyond its compass, and it would not conflict with itself its
32. Tennemann refers to Kant 1900, KrV B 3, p. 499 (Antinomies) and B 882 (His-
tory of Pure Reason); and id. KpV 5, p. 71 (he cites p. 125 of the 1792 ed.).
33. Later, in his historiographical work, Tennemann will famously describe the phi-
losophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the combat between Bacon’s and
Descartes’ empiricism. However, he did not provide an outright and general definition
of early modern empiricism at the beginning of his account, but rather characterized it
when exposing the philosophies of its representatives. See Tennemann 1798–1819, 10,
pp. 3–6, 7–197; vol. 11, passim; Tennemann 1816, # 312.
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theoretical and practical applications. By this means, Kant had cancelled
the contradiction between dogmatism and skepticism. In Tennemann’s
view, a deeper and more careful reading of the KrV reveals that its results
are true, and its methods are wise. In contrast, brief excursions into it will
only glimpse contradictions and inconsistencies and mistake the forest for
the trees (Tennemann 1806, 2, pp. 502–3).
These drawbacks also disclose that the philosophy of experience is un-
able to value the foundational work done by critical philosophy and, there-
fore, has a superficial idea of the relation of critical philosophy to other
systems. Despite Degérando’s insistence on the differences between empir-
icism and the philosophy of experience, Tennemann considered them as
only one philosophical system. Moreover, he did not find any substantial
distinction between Degérando’s philosophical preferences and the system
endorsed by French contemporary philosophy (Tennemann 1806, 1,
pp. xvi–xvii).
However, Tennemann seems to agree with Degérando’s strictures against
empiricism. Like Degérando praised Kant in that regard, Tennemann
valued the merits of Degérando’s broad narrative of philosophical sys-
tems, because he has properly revealed their extreme views. That not-
withstanding, the agreement between both historians ends there. In
fact, Tennemann thought that the philosophy of experience actually
makes the same mistakes as the previous systems. His line of argumenta-
tion consisted in showing that the only way of overcoming the limits of
empiricism is to endorse the approach of critical philosophy. Although
Degérando has rightly suggested that, in order that knowledge occurs,
something given as well as something provided by the faculty of knowing
are needed, he did not delineate the precise boundaries of knowledge
nor the exact middle way between exaggerations (Tennemann 1806, 2,
p. 473; Degérando 1802–4, 3, p. 508).
Despite the fact that in the Preface, Tennemann broadly associated
Degérando with the French philosophy of his time (Tennemann 1806,
1, p. xvii), he later claimed that the author of the Histoire comparée dis-
agreed with the idea maintained by the “French school” (idéologie) that
sensation and reflection are the origin of all knowledges. In contrast,
Degérando replaced sensation by experience, and distinguished between
internal and external experience. In so doing, Tennemann argued, he went
one step further towards the recognition that the source of knowledge is
not only the passivity of the mind (Gemüth) but also the activity of the
understanding (Verstand ), not only the material given in the experience,
but also the elaboration (Verarbeitung) and the connection (Verknüfung) per-
formed by reason. The acknowledgment of the activity of the mind was
also tacitly and more vaguely contained in the ideas of Degérando’s
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predecessors. Yet, neither of them dealt with questions which are funda-
mental for giving account of the nature of knowledge. Hence, Tennemann
concluded that Degérando does nothing but to change the names and to
keep the content: under the name of philosophy of experience he has reestab-
lished Locke’s empiricism (Tennemann 1806, 2, pp. 528–30). Tennemann’s
appreciation of Degérando’s and contemporary French philosophical views on
experience is in broad terms similar to Kant’s appreciation of Hume’s philos-
ophy:34 the French philosophers—to different degrees—began to find out
the active role of the mind in knowledge but did not advance towards the
a priori foundations of knowledge and experience.
With respect to this point, Tennemann provided three interesting final
remarks. The first one points to the bias of the argumentation of the
Histoire comparée: Degérando has established one of the parties, namely
the empiricists, as the umpire on a subject where empiricism itself must
be judged (Tennemann 1806, 2, p. 529). However, as the second remark
claims, empiricism cannot be entitled to judge other philosophies because
it has been already objected to itself on account of its incapacity to provide
proper principles to solve philosophical problems. In addition, empiricism
has been blamed for quarrelling with the practical interest of reason and
with man’s dignity (2, p. 529).
The last remark objects that empiricism does not provide a delimitation
of knowledge, nor the foundation of its uses and of the legitimate appli-
cation of the faculties of knowing. While it is aware of what is to be ex-
plained, it does not grasp the grounds and principles of the explanation. It
does not ask “what is experience” or “what is knowledge” because it con-
siders such questions superfluous. Only the indetermination established by
empiricism is what could have been considered by Degérando—from the
perspective of French philosophers—as something which appears to be
suitable to a general philosophical system. That means that Degérando
has assumed that the philosophy of experience is constituted by a bunch
of simple tenets, most suitable to combine themselves with other tenets.
Such tenets carry the philosophy of experience, whose limits are not deli-
mitated, into whatever is wanted, and to stop it at that experience that
would be found to be convenient (Tennemann 1806, 2, pp. 529–30).
9. Conclusion
Degérando’s and Tennemann’s discrepancies on experience and empir-
icism embraced not only a discussion of “nomenclatures” and of the role
and limits of experience in knowing. They imported epistemological and
political reflections about the pacification of the intellectual field in the
34. See Kant 1900, Prolegomena 3, pp. 258–62.
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aftermath of the French Revolution. In fact, Degérando rejected the accu-
sations addressed to Bacon and Locke as inspiring the political revolution-
ary events which took place in recent French history (Degérando 1802–4,
3, p. 580n1). Since, unlike Villers, philosophical moderation was a value
shared by Degérando and Tennemann they both celebrated the attempts to
construct this middle way.
This search for intellectual pacification took on the form of a refutation
of the precedent philosophical systems: rationalism, skepticism, material-
ism, idealism, dogmatism, and empiricism—in Degérando’s terminology.
If empiricism was the main target of this fight it was because experience
and its epistemological role was at the core of the philosophy of experience
and of critical philosophy as well. Both philosophers were convinced of the
centrality of experience for a genuine philosophical system and a true sci-
ence. Degérando felt the need to clarify the differences between the phi-
losophy of experience and empiricism, because he thought that the way in
which precedence was given to experience in the empiricism of his day,
particularly for the idéologues of the late eighteenth-century, was misguided.
Behind that “philosophical” reason, lay the “political” motivation of
distancing himself from the philosophical “sect” which had fell into dis-
grace under Bonaparte eye and had been associated with materialism, a
manifestation of French philosophy which Degérando’s narrative intended
to occult.35
According to Degérando, this way of understanding experience consti-
tuted, in fact, a deviation from the right path announced by Francis
Bacon.36 Later, in the third edition of Histoire comparée, Degérando insisted
on this point by claiming that actually Bacon thought that the opinions of
the empiricists were worse than those of the rationalists.37 Experience sep-
arated from reason can never reach a genuine knowledge of facts. That is
the reason why Degérando devoted so much effort to describe the relevant
functions of speculative truths in scientific knowledge. Even if this idea
implies a balance between experience and reason, it is evident that the em-
phasis is put on experience and that explains why the system cherished by
Degérando receives the label “philosophy of experience” and not “philos-
ophy of reason.”
35. On the occultation of materialism in Degérando’s account see Daled 2005.
36. He quoted Bacon 2004, p. 21, Preface to the Instauratio Magna. Degérando quotes—
with a slight omission—the French free translation from Lasalle, Bacon 1800 (an VIII), p. 31.
On Lasalle’s secular reading and translation of Bacon’s work see Malherbe 2000.
37. Degérando 1847, 2, pp. 41–2. It should be noted, however, that in the same work
(1847, 2, p. 91 note C) he noted that the summary of Bacon’s philosophy offered by
Tennemann—who described Bacon as an empiricist in Tennemann 1798–1819, X, pp. 3–5,
26–7),—is the most faithful and impartial that he knew.
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Yet, like Cousin, Degérando wanted not only to distance himself from
the gross empiricism or sensualism of this day but also from critical phi-
losophy.38 On this account, Tenneman cannot avoid his own objections
against the French historian. Despite Tennemann’s respect for Degérando’s
historiographical erudition, rhetorical skills, and serious interest for the
critical philosophy, and despite his decision of not intervening too much
into the original text, he could not help pointing to Degérando’s erroneous
assumptions on experience, and, above all, to his distorted reports of Kant’s
stances toward experience and empiricism. Experience was such a key no-
tion within critical philosophy that it was virtually impossible to leave
Degérando’s mistakes untouched.39
Both Degérando and Tennemann considered that empiricism –in the
several ways that they defined it—was a philosophical system that con-
tained some merits, albeit it required substantial reform to provide a the-
oretical foundation for knowledge. They celebrated the intention to amend
empiricism and to depurate it from its mistakes. However, they blamed
each other for being empiricists without knowing it, because they em-
braced philosophies which fall into a deformed view of experience. Expe-
rience was too big an issue to be confused with rough empiricism. That
was going to be a challenge fueling the French intellectual debate for the
rest of the nineteenth-century.
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